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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiff Samuel L. Boyd appeals from orders of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Boyd's fourth cause of action for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and dismissing Boyd's remaining 
claims for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Boyd filed this appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, which poured the case over to this Court. 
Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(k) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW1 
1. Did the trial court properly dismiss Boyd's claims with prejudice pursuant to Rule 
41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in light of his total failure to prosecute this action? 
The disposition of a motion for failure to prosecute rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and should not be upset absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. Wilson v. Lambert, 
613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). 
lIn his brief, Boyd sets forth five issues, which Burbidge and Kirton have condensed into the two set forth 
herein. Defendants also note that Boyd has failed to identify where in the record each of his five issues was 
preserved for appeal, as required by Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Moreover, Boyd makes an argument at pages 23-25 of his brief that is neither included in the statement 
of issues nor raised below. He argues that the trial court was required "to implement procedures to move the case 
along that were less harsh than dismissal with prejudice." (Brief of Appellant, at 23). That argument was not 
raised below and therefore is not properly before this Court. Lander v. Industrial Comm 'n, 894 P. 2d 552, 557 
(Utah App. 1995). Moreover, the argument is unsupported by any case authority, and Burbidge and Kirton are 
aware of none, that requires a court to impose intermediate measures. Indeed, if such a requirement exists, one 
wonders what the purpose of Rule 41 (b) is, particularly in light of the court's authority to dismiss under Rule 41(b) 
sua sponte. 
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2. Did the trial court properly dismiss Boyd's fourth cause of action because the 
Utah Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to 30, does not provide a private right of action? 
This issue presents a question of law, which this Court reviews under a correctness standard. 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).2 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following rules are determinative of this appeal: 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with 
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the 
plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has 
completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without 
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not 
granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the 
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make 
findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order 
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision 
and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack 
of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 41(b). 
2Defendants I appellees Burbidge and Kirtonjoin in and adopt the brief of Appellees Harmon on this issue, and 
accordingly do not treat it independently herein. 
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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
[T]he following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made 
by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
Boyd, a Texas attorney, appeals the trial court's determination that he failed to prosecute 
his action, which warranted dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The events underlying Boyd's lawsuit occurred in Utah in 1986. Boyd's predecessor-in-interest, 
his client, with Boyd's assistance, filed an action in Texas state court in 1988 which alleged 
essentially the same claims as presented here. The Texas action was dismissed in 1991 for lack 
of jurisdiction over the persons, all of whom are named as Defendants in this Utah action. Boyd 
filed, but did not serve, the Complaint in the instant action in March of 1992; later in 1992, he 
filed an Amended Complaint and served it upon all but one Defendant. 
Those Defendants that were served with the Amended Complaint either answered or filed 
motions to dismiss Boyd's claims. From the time Boyd filed the Amended Complaint on July 
10, 1992, until Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution in January and 
February of 1995, Boyd took absolutely no affirmative action to move his case forward. Nor 
did he serve discovery requests. The only involvement in the lawsuit he initiated was to respond 
to Defendants' motions in late 1992 and early 1993. 
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In light of Boyd's failure to do anything to move this case along, in conjunction with 
other factors, the trial court dismissed this action with prejudice. Boyd appeals from that ruling. 
In addition, he appeals from the trial court's ruling that his fourth cause of action failed to state 
a claim under the Utah Securities Act. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. On or about July 10, 1992, Samuel L. Boyd ("Boyd" or "Plaintiff") filed his 
Amended Complaint against Brinton Burbidge ("Burbidge"), Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
("Kirton"), and numerous other Defendants. (R. 0010-18). 
2. On August 11, 1992, Burbidge and Kirton filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Complaint and Request for Oral Argument, along with a Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion. (R. 0051-60). 
3. Boyd's original Utah counsel withdrew, with Boyd's consent, on September 1, 
1992. (R. 94-95). Boyd represented himself in this matter until his current Utah counsel filed 
a notice of appearance on January 14, 1993. (R. 0220-21). 
4. On or about September 17, 1992, Boyd filed his Opposition to Burbidge and 
Kirton's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 0109-127). 
5. On September 22, 1992, Burbidge and Kirton filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion to Dismiss Complaint. (R. 0128-31). 
6. On January 15, 1993, the Court held a hearing on Burbidge and Kirton's Motion 
to Dismiss and took the matter under advisement. (R. 0222). 
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7. On February 23, 1993, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision by which it 
denied the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief, and granted 
the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief. (R. 0223-28). 
8. On March 10, 1993, Nielsen & Senior filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the 
pleadings and a Memorandum in Support of that motion. (R. 0239-45). Nielsen & Senior's 
motion was not opposed by Plaintiff. 
9. On March 12, 1993, Kirton and Burbidge filed their Answer to Amended 
Complaint. (R. 0246-52). 
10* On April 14, 1993, the Court issued a Supplement to its Memorandum Decision, 
by which it clarified that its Memorandum Decision dismissed Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief 
not only against Kirton and Burbidge, but also against Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon. (R. 
0257-60). 
11. On April 20, 1993, the Court granted Nielsen & Senior's Motion for Partial 
Judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief against Nielsen & 
Senior. (R. 0261). 
12. On or about April 26, 1993, Defendants Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and 
Doreen Harmon (the "Harmon Defendants") filed their Answer to Amended Complaint. (R. 
0263-69). 
13. On or about May 21, 1993, Defendant Nielsen & Senior filed an Amended 
Answer to Amended Complaint, pursuant to a Stipulation For Leave to File Amended Answer 
filed concurrently therewith. (R. 0274-81). 
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14. On January 26, 1995, Burbidge and Kirton filed their Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Prosecute. (R. 0297-99). Shortly, thereafter, the other defendants each filed similar 
motions. (R. 0307-09, 0316-18, 0329-31). 
15. After Plaintiff had submitted written memoranda in opposition to the motions, the 
matter came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1995. (R. 0798-827). The Court, after 
considering the written memoranda and the oral argument of all counsel, made specific findings 
of fact and conclusions of law on the record. (R. 0790-97). 
16. Counsel for Burbidge and Kirton prepared Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (the "Proposed Findings and Conclusions") and a Proposed Order Granting 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute ("Proposed Order") and served them 
on counsel for Plaintiff on April 17, 1995. (R. 0592, 1 13). 
17. In response, Plaintiff filed an objection to the Proposed Findings and Conclusions 
and to the Proposed Order. (R. 0410-579). In addition, Plaintiff filed a motion asking the 
Court to reconsider the ruling made at the April 6, 1995 hearing. (R. 0405-06). 
18. The Court denied Boyd's Motion for Reconsideration and rejected the objections 
to the Proposed Findings and Conclusions by minute entry dated June 1, 1995. (R. 0711-12). 
The Court entered an order reflecting its ruling on June 16, 1995. (R. 0739-41). 
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C. Response to Boyd's Statement of Facts 
1. In Paragraph 9, Boyd claims to have had "settlement negotiations" with Burbidge 
and Kirton. This assertion ignores the trial court's findings. In the face of conflicting affidavits 
from Thomas L. Kay and Jeffrey M. Jones, the trial court found: 
19. During February 1994, Thomas L. Kay, counsel for 
Burbidge and Kirton, encountered Jeffrey M. Jones, counsel for 
Plaintiff, at court. During that chance encounter, Mr. Kay 
suggested to Mr. Jones that he either "do something" to move this 
lawsuit along or else dismiss the claims against Burbidge and 
Kirton. Mr. Jones responded that he would look into it. No other 
discussions occurred: no monetary or other settlement terms were 
exchanged, and no negotiations took place. Despite this 
conversation, neither Mr. Jones nor any other attorney in his firm 
did anything to move the lawsuit along or to dismiss the claims 
against Burbidge and Kirton. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 0716). Boyd has not argued that this finding of 
fact is clearly erroneous, and should not now be permitted to allege as "fact" a statement 
contrary to the trial court's unchallenged findings. That Boyd wishes the trial court had accepted 
Mr. Jones' testimony over Mr. Kay's does not elevate Mr. Jones' testimony to the level of a 
finding of fact. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling in all respects. The trial court entered 
comprehensive factual findings that Boyd has not challenged as clearly erroneous. Those facts 
show that Boyd did nothing to move his case along, and that the only active parties in this 
lawsuit were Defendants. In light of Boyd's failure to diligently pursue his claims, along with 
the prejudice to Defendants and the likelihood that evidence has become stale, dismissal with 
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prejudice was not only a permissible remedy, but indeed the only means of serving justice and 
avoiding further prejudice to Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION AND 
DISMISSED THIS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
A. Boyd Bears The Burden of Demonstrating Both An Abuse of The Trial Court's 
Discretion And An Injustice, A Burden He Cannot Satisfy 
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Boyd's action with prejudice and 
on the merits. Boyd concedes that the burden he bears on appeal from a Rule 41(b) dismissal 
is heavy: the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of the court's broad 
discretion and a likelihood of injustice. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694, 
697 (Utah App. 1994); Charlie Brown Const. Co. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). Boyd cannot carry that burden. 
L The Trial Court Considered All Five Required Factors And Did Not 
Abuse Its Discretion In Concluding That Dismissal Was Warranted 
In order to prove that the trial court abused its discretion, Boyd must be able to show that 
the trial court's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or not based on either adequate findings of 
fact or on the law. May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984). He cannot do so. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion and ordered dismissal of this case. 
In his attempt to establish an abuse of discretion, Boyd acknowledges that a trial court 
enjoys a wide degree of latitude in exercising its discretion pursuant to Rule 41(b). 
Furthermore, he recognizes that a court faced with a Rule 41(b) Motion should consider the 
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following factors: (1) the conduct of the parties; (2) each party's opportunity to move the case 
along; (3) each party's actions to move the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice caused 
to the parties; and (5) whether injustice will result from the dismissal. Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 
P.2d 237, ^39 (Utah App.), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
The trial court considered each of these five factors in ruling on the various motions to 
dismiss. As the trial court properly found, each of these factors weighs in favor of dismissal. 
The trial court was not arbitrary or capricious in so ruling, and the decision is based both on 
significant factual findings and an accurate reading of the law. 
a. The Conduct Of The Parties Supports Dismissal 
The only significant activity in this case has been on the part of Defendants. Defendants 
have played an active role in this case, moving it along and trying to prompt Boyd to act. Boyd, 
in contrast, did nothing for more than two years, while Defendants suffered under the cloud of 
this litigation. Boyd brought that cloud upon them by filing this suit, and his dilatory conduct 
and lengthy inactivity exacerbated the negative effects of the pending action. Defendants have 
acted conscientiously and diligently, while Boyd has done nothing. 
When the defendants take action to further a case, and the plaintiff does nothing, 
dismissal is proper. Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1975) (affirming 
dismissal where defendants filed notice requiring a bond and took a deposition, while plaintiff 
failed to take appropriate steps to prepare and prosecute claim). In this case, the trial court 
entered the following findings of fact supporting dismissal: 
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24. Plaintiff did not initiate any discovery until after the 
Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute were pending before 
the Court. Initiating discovery at this late date was Plaintiff's first 
affirmative conduct in more than two years, and the only action 
taken other than filing the Amended Complaint. 
25. There has been no real activity in the case for over 
two years. 
26. Plaintiff had over three years to pursue his claim 
and has chosen not to do so. He has had a forum for the 
resolution of his disputes and has chosen not to use it. 
27. The onus was not on Defendants to undertake 
expensive discovery or other action when Plaintiff had taken no 
action to further his lawsuit. 
28. Other than the filing of the Complaint, all action 
taken in this lawsuit has been initiated by Defendants. Plaintiff 
has filed no dispositive motions. In fact, it is Defendants' activity 
that has generated the majority of the work in this case, and all of 
the activity for the last several years. 
29. Plaintiff offered no sufficiently reasonable or viable 
excuse for his lack of diligence and the Court can find none. 
(Findings of Fact, R. 0717). 
Boyd has not challenged these findings3 or marshalled any evidence showing them to be 
clearly erroneous. Instead, he merely disagrees with the conclusions the trial court drew from 
them. Unfortunately for Boyd, case law supports the trial court's conclusions. See, e.g.. 
Country Meadows Convalescence Center v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah App. 1993); 
3
 Boyd has never challenged Finding of Fact No. 29 and presumably concedes its truth, i.e., that there is no 
viable excuse for his failure to prosecute. The only explanation Boyd offered for his lack of action was his 
involvement in a fee dispute with his original Utah counsel. Boyd never asserted that the fee dispute in any way 
prevented him from moving this action forward. 
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Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 1368 (Utah App.), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). This 
factor weighs in favor of dismissal, and this Court should affirm the trial court's findings and 
conclusions on this factor. 
b. Boyd Had The Opportunity and Duty To Move The Case Forward 
Boyd cannot seriously dispute that the onus was on him to move his lawsuit along. A 
plaintiff has a duty to prosecute its case that defendants do not share. As stated by this Court, 
"Although inaction on the part of a defendant may contribute to the justifiability of a plaintiffs 
excuse for delay, the duty to prosecute is a duty of due diligence imposed on the plaintiff, not 
on a defendant." Country Meadows Convalescence Center v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 
1216 (Utah App. 1993). This Court has commented on what it has deemed the "obvious" 
respective responsibilities of litigants: 
What each party has done to move the case forward can 
only be evaluated in light of each party's responsibility concerning 
the case. Of course, the plaintiff, as the party initiating the 
lawsuit, has the primary responsibility to move the case forward. 
The defendant's responsibility is limited to responding timely to 
the action, expeditiously attending to discovery, and moving any 
counterclaim along. The defendant has no general responsibility 
to move plaintiffs action to judgment. 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694, 698 n.2 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis 
in original). 
The trial court agreed with the above-quoted decisions, finding that "[t]he onus was not 
on Defendants to undertake expensive discovery or other action when Plaintiff had taken no 
action to further this lawsuit." (Findings of Fact No. 27, R. 0717). It was up to Boyd to 
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prosecute his claim with "due diligence" or else face dismissal. Charlie Brown, 740 P.2d at 
1370. Boyd failed to move the case forward as he was required to do, and the trial court 
correctly so found. 
c. Only Defendants Have Moved This Case Along 
The trial court recognized that Defendants are the sole reason this case ever moved 
beyond the initial pleading stage: 
28. Other than the filing of the Complaint, all action 
taken in this lawsuit has been initiated by Defendants. Plaintiff 
has filed no dispositive motions. In fact, it is Defendants' activity 
that has generated the majority of the work in this case, and all of 
the activity for the last several years. 
(Findings of Fact, R. 0717). 
As already described, Boyd has not undertaken any affirmative conduct to move this case 
forward, other than his ill-fated, after-the-fact request for a scheduling conference discussed 
below. (Finding of Fact No. 24, R. 0717). The findings of fact clearly reflect the consistent 
pattern in this case: Defendants have acted, while Boyd has done nothing to further his case. 
This factor weighs in favor of dismissal, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so 
ruling. 
d. Defendants Have Been Prejudiced By Boyd's Failure To Prosecute 
The trial court concluded that Defendants incurred considerable expense and time 
expenditures during the pendency of this lawsuit. (Finding of Fact No. 30, R. 0717). This 
finding is amply supported by credible record evidence. (See, e.g., R. 0632-35, 0647-58). 
Furthermore, the trial court found other forms of prejudice to Defendants. 
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Three findings of fact summarize this prejudice: 
30. The pendency of this lawsuit has required the 
presence and activity of six attorneys, has necessitated an 
expenditure of their time and energy, and has resulted in 
considerable expense and concomitant prejudice to Defendants, 
their clients. 
31. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the 
attorney-Defendants must maintain professional liability coverage 
and insurance and, in so doing, must undertake significant 
reporting to maintain that insurance. 
32. The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that 
all Defendants must pay attorneys to defend them and incur costs 
in connection with the defense and opinions regarding ongoing 
liability and loss contingency. 
(Findings of Fact, R. 0717-18). Prejudice also arises from the delay in prosecuting this case. 
The events underlying Boyd's claim arose in 1986 — ten years ago. (Finding of Fact No. 2, R. 
0714). A delay of ten years causes prejudice because evidence becomes stale and witnesses may 
have moved or forgotten the facts. Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (Utah App. 1991). 
Boyd has previously subjected these Utah Defendants to other unnecessary burdens in the 
form of the Texas state court action which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the 
persons of all Utah based Defendants, after more than two years of procedural skirmishing in 
Texas trial and appellate courts. Boyd dismissed the Texas appeal in favor of this Utah action. 
Boyd struggles desperately to downplay the prejudice to Defendants from the ten year 
passage of time by relying on depositions that occurred in the Texas litigation. However, those 
depositions dealt solely with the jurisdiction of the Texas court and did not address the factual 
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allegations of Boyd's claims. (Affidavits of Matt Hilton, Blake Ostler, and Earl Jay Peck, R. 
0704-07, 0724-28, 0733-38). As such, Boyd has done nothing to gather evidence to support his 
claims, and Defendants will be prejudiced if required to attempt to defeat his allegations some 
ten years after the events in question occurred. The trial court properly recognized the prejudice 
that would result if Boyd's lawsuit proceeded. As such, this factor supports dismissal, and the 
trial court was correct in so finding. 
e. Justice Has Been Served 
Boyd attempts to evoke this Court's sympathy by exclaiming "an injustice has been 
wrought." (Brief of Appellant, at 16). If any injustice has occurred, it is Defendants who have 
been the victims. First, they were forced to sit by for more than two years while Boyd did 
nothing. And when they finally sought an end to this dormant litigation, they were met with a 
flurry of after-the-fact activity designed to evade the inevitable. Then, when the trial court 
concluded that this case should be dismissed, they suffered an onslaught of redundant pleadings 
that only wasted the trial court's resources as well as their own. 
After winning at every stage before the trial court, Defendants are now forced to defend 
in this appeal, in which Boyd repeats the very same arguments that failed to persuade the trial 
court. Those arguments continue to fail, not because of injustice, but simply because they lack 
merit. The authorities cited in this brief and the pleadings in the record amply demonstrate that 
dismissal with prejudice is the just, appropriate result. 
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The trial court addressed this factor and found: 
4. Because Plaintiff had three years to pursue his 
claim, but chose not to do so, he is not unfairly prejudiced by 
dismissal of this action. In light of the Court's findings of fact, no 
injustice will result from dismissal. 
(Conclusions of Law, R. 0718). Utah case law supports this conclusion. The cases upon which 
Boyd tries to rely are all factually distinguishable, and thus of no help to him, in that those cases 
involved one or more of the following: (1) the party objecting to dismissal had undertaken 
significant discovery, Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1975); (2) the party seeking dismissal had failed to fulfill a duty imposed by the 
procedural circumstances of the case, Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694 
(Utah App. 1994), and Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977); (3) the party 
objecting to dismissal could have obtained immediate relief on its complaint merely by making 
a ministerial filing but failed to do so before the motion to dismiss was filed, Johnson v. 
Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977); or (4) bona fide settlement negotiations caused the delay, 
Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 585 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977).4 
None of those distinguishing factors exist here. Rather, as the trial court found, Boyd 
failed to take any action to move this case along, although he had three years to do so. He 
cannot now claim injustice when the power to act was his, yet he chose not to use it. 
The issue of settlement negotiations is discussed more fully below. 
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B. There Is Absolutely No Likelihood of Injustice 
As just described, the facts of this case amply demonstrate that not only is there no 
likelihood of injustice in dismissing this case, but justice will actually be served if this Court 
affirms the dismissal. If this Court were to accept Boyd's redundant excuses and reverse the 
trial court's dismissal, it would eviscerate Rule 41(b). 
Justice is served when plaintiffs timely prosecute their actions or face dismissal when they 
fail to do so. Justice is served when defendants have access to fresh evidence and witnesses in 
order to prepare their defense, and can ask the court to remove them from the cloud of a 
dormant lawsuit caused by a dilatory plaintiff. Justice is served when rules of procedure are 
enforced. Justice was served in this case when the trial court ordered dismissal. This Court 
should likewise serve justice and affirm that dismissal. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
Utah's appellate courts, including this Court, have recognized that a dismissal for failure 
to prosecute is with prejudice and on the merits. Charlie Brown, 740 P.2d at 1371; accord 
Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1217 (Utah 1993). Rule 41(b) itself 
authorizes dismissal with prejudice unless the trial court orders otherwise. Utah R. Civ. P. 
41(b). 
In this case, the trial court explicitly ruled that dismissal was with prejudice. (Conclusion 
of Law No. 6, R. 0719). Thus, Boyd cannot challenge Rule 41(b)'s default to dismissal with 
prejudice because the trial court made an express ruling. Instead, Boyd can only attack the trial 
court's decision to dismiss with prejudice. 
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Curiously absent from Boyd's brief is any authority supporting his suggestion that 
dismissal with prejudice was improper. Kirton and Burbidge are aware of no authority requiring 
dismissal without prejudice on facts analogous to this case. Indeed, dismissal without prejudice 
would make no sense in this case, because Boyd would simply refile his case and start all over 
again. Were that appropriate, the trial court would not have dismissed at all. But the whole 
point of this dismissal was that Boyd failed to prosecute this action, and that Defendants suffered 
significant prejudice therefrom. 
While it may be unfortunate that Boyd lost his claims thereby, that loss was entirely his 
own fault. Dismissal without prejudice would not protect Defendants from Boyd's dilatory 
conduct and would serve no useful purpose. Boyd's argument on this point lacks support and 
merit. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the dismissal with prejudice and on the merits. 
IH- THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED BOYD'S ATTEMPT TO AVOID 
DISMISSAL BY FILING A DELINQUENT SCHEDULING REQUEST 
On January 14, 1993, Boyd filed a Notice of Appearance of Counsel informing the trial 
court that he was represented by new counsel. (R. 0220). The next day, the trial court held a 
hearing on several pending motions to dismiss, at which Boyd was represented by counsel. (R. 
0222). The trial court, like Defendants, did not hear from Boyd again until more than two years 
later when he filed his memorandum opposing dismissal on February 9, 1995, at which time not 
one but three Motions To Dismiss had been filed. (R. 0319-26). 
Also on February 9, Boyd for the first time requested a scheduling conference — an 
obvious, last-chance attempt to fend off the ensuing dismissal. (R. 0327). The trial court 
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recognized that Boyd could not attempt to initiate discovery when Motions to Dismiss were 
pending, stating that it would not consider anything that happened after the first Motion to 
Dismiss was filed. (R. 806; see also Brief of Appellant, n. 51). In addition, the trial court 
made a finding concerning Boyd's eleventh-hour attempt to invoke the discovery process: 
24. Plaintiff did not initiate any discovery until after the 
Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute were pending before 
the Court. Initiating discovery at this late date was Plaintiff's first 
affirmative conduct in more than two years, and the only action 
taken other than filing the Amended Complaint. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 0717). Boyd's request was nothing more than 
a ruse to avoid dismissal, and the trial court properly rejected it. 
Boyd makes the facile assertion that by filing the request for a scheduling conference, 
"any period of inactivity had ended." (Brief of Appellant, at 25). This simply cannot be the 
case. Otherwise, any plaintiff facing a Motion to Dismiss For Failure to Prosecute would dash 
off to court and file some sort of motion, request, or discovery document in order to breathe 
new life into a dead case. Were that permitted, Rule 41(b) would have no meaning. The 
drafters of Rule 41(b) could not have intended for it to be circumvented so easily. 
The trial court recognized that Boyd did nothing for more than two years: 
25. There has been no real activity in the case for over 
two years. 
26. Plaintiff has had over three years to pursue his claim 
and has chosen not to do so. He has had a forum for resolution 
of his disputes and has chosen not to use it. 
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(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 0717). His request for a scheduling conference 
did not change anything, as the trial court correctly recognized. This Court should reach the 
same conclusion and affirm the dismissal with prejudice. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO DELAY 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO SETTLEMENT EFFORTS, SINCE NO SETTLEMENT 
NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE IN THE TWO YEARS PRIOR TO 
DEFENDANTS' SEEKING DISMISSAL, WHICH FINDING BOYD 
CONSISTENTLY IGNORES 
Boyd continues to insist that settlement negotiations took place and that dismissal was 
therefore inappropriate under Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977). That 
argument ignores the trial court's express findings of fact, which include: 
19. During February 1994, Thomas L. Kay, counsel for 
Burbidge and Kirton, encountered Jeffrey M. Jones, counsel for 
Plaintiff, at court. During that chance encounter, Mr. Kay 
suggested to Mr. Jones that he either "do something" to move this 
lawsuit along or else dismiss the claims against Burbidge and 
Kirton. Mr. Jones responded that he would look into it. No other 
discussion occurred: no monetary or other settlement terms were 
exchanged, and no negotiations took place. Despite this 
conversation, neither Mr. Jones nor any other attorney in his firm 
did anything to move this lawsuit along or to dismiss the claims 
against Burbidge and Kirton. 
20. Nielsen and Senior and its counsel have not engaged 
in any settlement discussions with Plaintiff for more than two 
years. 
21. No settlement discussions have taken place between 
Plaintiff and the Harmon Defendants. 
22. No settlement discussions have taken place between 
Plaintiff and Hilton. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 0716). 
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Boyd has not argued that these findings are clearly erroneous. Instead, he relies on the 
testimony of Jeffrey M. Jones that contradicted the Affidavit of Thomas L. Kay. (R. 0613-14). 
Unfortunately for Boyd, the trial court accepted as true the sworn testimony of Mr. Kay, as 
evidenced by Finding of Fact No. 19, and impliedly rejected Mr. Jones' version of events, as 
it was entitled to. Boyd cannot continue to harp on Mr. Jones' testimony in light of the trial 
court's contrary findings and clear rejection of his testimony. Absent any bona fide challenge 
to these findings, this Court should accept them notwithstanding Boyd's unsubstantiated 
complaints. 
Even if this Court were to give credence to the Jones Affidavit, Utah Oil Co. would 
nonetheless not help Boyd. In Utah Oil Co., the parties had filed responsive pleadings, motions, 
and discovery, after which a pre-trial hearing was scheduled. Utah Oil Co., 565 P.2d at 1136. 
The parties then reached a compromise settlement, and the scheduled pre-trial hearing was 
therefore stricken. IdL The order striking the pre-trial hearing provided that the matter would 
not be rescheduled without a request being filed. IcL Six months later, the plaintiff's counsel 
withdrew, and only one defendant filed the statutory notice instructing the plaintiff to retain new 
counsel. Id A Rule 41(b) motion followed sixteen months later. 
The Utah Oil Co. Court reversed the dismissal of the case for all of those factual reasons, 
none of which exist here. The Court observed that the defendants could and should have 
requested a resetting of the stricken hearing, as the trial court had mandated. IdL at 1137. In 
other words, because the court had ordered both sides to file a request in order to reschedule 
the hearing, defendants had an affirmative duty to act. Settlement negotiations were only one 
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aspect of the Court's reasons for reversing the dismissal. Moreover, the settlement negotiations 
in Utah Oil were of record in the compromise settlement that resulted in striking the pre-trial 
hearing. Id at 1136. Here, in contrast, the only reference to settlement negotiations is Mr. 
Jones' assertion that he conveyed "terms" to Mr. Kay, which "terms" have never been defined 
or explained. Thus, even if this Court accepts the Jones Affidavit over the Kay Affidavit, the 
result would be the same under Utah Oil: affirmance of the dismissal. 
This Court should recognize Boyd's claim of settlement negotiations for what it is: a 
desperate attempt to divert this Court's attention from his failure to do anything to prosecute this 
lawsuit. The trial court saw through this diversion, and this Court should do the same. 
V. THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS BOYD'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION, 
ALLEGING VIOLATION OF THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT, BECAUSE 
DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE IS DISPOSITIVE OF ALL ISSUES 
As shown above, the trial court properly dismissed this action, with prejudice, for Boyd's 
failure to prosecute. Accordingly, this Court need not address any other issue which the case 
might arguably have presented. Utah courts have uniformly held that where dismissal for failure 
to prosecute is dispositive, other issues raised by the plaintiff need not be addressed. For 
example, in Maxfield v. Rushton, Maxfield appealed the dismissal of his action for failure to 
prosecute, the lower court's refusal to grant him summary judgment, and that court's refusal to 
void a sheriff's sale. 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989). The appellate court affirmed the 
dismissal, and because the affirmance was dispositive, declined to address the remaining issues. 
Id. at 241. 
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Likewise, in Schoney v. Memorial Estates. Inc.. 790 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1990), cert. 
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), the Schoneys appealed from a summary judgment entered 
on the merits and from a default judgment entered for failure to respond timely to a discovery 
request. The appellate court affirmed the default judgment and declared that such determination 
was dispositive of the case and that it "need not address whether summary judgment was also 
proper in this case." Id. 790 P.2d at 587. Most recently, in Country Meadows Convalescent 
Center v. Utah Dept. of Health. 851 P.2d 1212, 1217 (Utah App. 1993), the dismissal pursuant 
to Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute was affirmed. Such a dismissal, with prejudice, was 
dispositive of the case, and the court declined to consider the merits of defendant Utah 
Department of Health's motion for summary judgment. 
The foregoing authorities leave no doubt that affirmance of the dismissal of Boyd's case 
will be dispositive of all issues raised on appeal, including even matters unrelated to the 
dismissal for lack of prosecution. All of the issues identified by Boyd are disposed of by 
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this action, with prejudice, 
for lack of prosecution. Therefore, the issue of whether Boyd had a private right of action to 
sue under § 61-1-22 of the Utah Code, need not and should not be reached.5 
Because the trial court's entry of dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) is fully supported as 
indicated by the foregoing analysis, and entry of the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute 
5This result is particularly appropriate where the Utah Supreme Court has previously decided this issue, and 
held that the Utah Uniform Securities Act does not provide a private remedy for violation of its provisions. See 
Millinery. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974). The Milliner opinion was the primary basis for the 
trial court's ruling that no such private cause of action was available to Boyd. 
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was sufficient, in itself, to fully dispose of this case, this Court need not address the issue of 
whether the prior dismissal of Boyd's Fourth Cause of Action, alleging violation of the Utah 
Securities Act, was proper. Simply put, the dismissal for failure to prosecute "'operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits' of the case." Country Meadows Convalescent Center, 851 P.2d 
at 1217 (quoting Marfisld v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989)). 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BOYD'S FOURTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION 
In the event that this Court should reach the issue of whether the trial court properly 
dismissed Boyd's Fourth Cause of Action, despite the subsequent dismissal for failure to 
prosecute, Burbidge and Kirton join in and adopt the argument of Appellees Harmon on this 
point. Boyd's Fourth Cause of Action was properly dismissed, and this Court should affirm the 
trial court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court ruled correctly in all respects. Therefore, this 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
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